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ABSTRACT
In this article, I examine the extent to which military officers are
morally responsible for the actions of others by virtue of shared
membership in various groups. I argue that career military
officers share membership in morally relevant groups that
include their branch of service, Department of Defense and the
entire Executive Branch of Government, and I outline the
circumstances under which career officers bear moral
culpability for the actions of members of this group. A number
of implications arise from these findings. The first and most
important is that military officers have an interest in ensuring
the moral rectitude of government agents specifically as it
pertains to their official capacities. Additionally, military officers
have a duty not only to be informed about problematic
government policies but also to educate themselves on the
pertinent legal jurisprudence or ethical considerations. Finally,
the Constitutional Paradigm of Military Ethics may be an
insufficient guide for the particular sort of moral dilemma dealt








The purpose of this article is to outline a set of circumstances under which we may
ascribe moral blame to military members for the actions of others by virtue of shared
membership in morally relevant groups, such as their service, the Department of
Defense and the Executive Branch of the US government.1 While military members
of all ranks may face these concerns, I focus my attention on the case of career military
officers and their relationship to other government agents who may develop, promul-
gate and execute immoral or unconstitutional policy. My argument is that an individual
officer’s moral standing can be affected not only by the actions of those outside his or
her unit, but also by the actions of those outside the military.
Employment for career military officers is, for the most part, voluntary. Voluntary
membership in an organization implies that the member condones, or at least tolerates,
the principles for which the group stands and the policy that it executes. Thus, while a
military officer may not be directly involved in the execution of immoral or
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unconstitutional policy embarked upon by some other department of government, they
may still be morally blameworthy unless they take action to relieve themselves of the
blame.
Several government policies in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks serve as the
inspiration for this inquiry. While assessing the moral validity and constitutionality
of policies such as indefinite detention, warrantless wiretapping, enhanced interrog-
ation techniques, targeted killing of American citizens and preemptive war, to name
a few, is well outside the scope of the present essay, the conscientious officer has a
duty to be aware of and form an opinion regarding these and many other controversial
issues. Such policies could conceivably rise to a level that compels those military
officers, even if not directly involved, to act in opposition lest they suffer the censure
of moral blame.
A number of implications arise from these findings. The first and most important is
that military officers have an interest in ensuring the moral rectitude of government
agents as it pertains to their official capacities. Additionally, military officers have a
duty not only to be informed about problematic government policies, but also to edu-
cate themselves on the pertinent legal jurisprudence or ethical considerations. Finally, I
claim that the Constitutional Paradigm of Military Ethics is an insufficient guide for the
particular sort of moral dilemma dealt with in this article (Roush 2008).
1.1 The Moral Imperative
In order to specify what is meant by guilt and blame, I will adopt French’s (1998: 7)
framework on this matter and define fault as the ‘cause of some failure’, guilt as the
‘willful breach of a code of conduct’, and blame as the ‘censure coincidental with
one’s being held liable for some substandard behavior or trait of character’. It is
common for fault, guilt and blame for a given incident to reside in the same person.
However, this is not always necessarily so. For example, suppose a delivery truck driver
runs a red light and collides with another car. The driver may be at fault because he or
she was in control of the vehicle at the time, but the driver’s employer may be guilty of
negligence if, say, the employer did not properly train the employee. In this article, I am
primarily concerned with whether, and under what conditions, we may ascribe blame to
a military officer based on the behavior of individuals who are also government employ-
ees. While these other employees may be guilty of engaging in immoral, illegal, or
unconstitutional behavior, if certain sufficiency conditions hold, we may ascribe
additional blame for such actions to other agents of the government, including career
military officers.
Throughout this work, I leverage the concept of moral imperative. A moral impera-
tive arises when an individual is party, in some manner, to actions that breach the rules
of ethical conduct and the individual is assigned moral blame for those actions. To
remain ethical, the individual is then under the burden of the moral imperative to
resolve this breach. That is, if the individual continues his or her behavior relative to
the ethical breach he or she continues to accumulate moral culpability. The moral
imperative consists in having to change his or her behavior in some way in order to
resolve the breach and possibly make amends. While I specifically refer to moral





































blame or responsibility rather than legal blame, I assert that the professional military
ethic incorporates the notion that a violation of the Constitution constitutes a moral
breach in addition to any legal implications. For the purposes of this article, it is not
necessary to settle once and for all what constitutes immoral, illegal, or unconstitutional
policy or activity. All that is necessary is for the reader to accept that an agency of the
government could ever plausibly implement such a policy.
1.2 Group Moral Responsibility
Warfare is an inherently collective and violent human endeavor, which makes it
immensely fertile ground for ethical and philosophical considerations. It is no surprise
that the debate regarding the concept of collective responsibility in the twentieth cen-
tury sprang forth from discussions of the reasonableness of placing blame for atrocities
committed during the Second World War and the Vietnam War (French 1998, Lewis
1948).2
Scholars who study collective responsibility typically concern themselves with
whether, and under what conditions, it is appropriate to consider groups as moral
agents capable of causing harm and receiving blame. Discussions tend to center on
whether collective responsibility is a valid concept and whether, and to what extent,
blame can be distributed across the individuals within the group (Smiley 2011).
Researchers such as French (1984), May (1987), Abdel-Nour (2003) and Davion
(2006) apply these concepts to collectives such as corporations, ethnic groups and
nations, to name a few.
Researchers working in the area of military ethics have touched on some of these
ideas. For example, McMahan (2007b) argues that the foundation of just war theory
is based in part on notions of collective responsibility. Ingierd and Syse (2005) approach
the issue of culpability for the commission of atrocities by those inside the military, but
direct their attention primarily to decision makers. Crawford (2007) also examines atro-
cities, but considers culpability in terms of the organization, the state and the public.
Finally, Sandin (2007) examines the virtues that one might ascribe to military organiz-
ations as collectives. While I leverage a number of ideas of scholars who publish in this
literature, as well as the broader literature on collective responsibility, the contribution
in this article is unique in outlining how a military officer can be placed under the bur-
den of a moral imperative due to the actions (or inaction) of other employees of the
federal government.
I do not necessarily presume to weigh in on the larger philosophical discussion of
collective responsibility. All that is necessary for the present discussion is that the reader
accepts that it is plausible that an individual, or individuals, can engage in behavior in
their capacities as members of a particular group that renders the group blameworthy.
This moral culpability is then transmitted to all other members of the group through
any number of possible mechanisms. While I prefer Narveson’s (2002) framework,
due to his commitment to methodological individualism and his rejection of the notion
of irreducible responsibility, the argument that I present in this article is not necessarily
incompatible with other approaches, particularly those that allow for the distribution of





































collective responsibility to the individual group members in some form (e.g. Gilbert
2006, May 1987, Mellema 2006, Raikka 1997).
For Narveson, only individuals can bear responsibility for immoral behavior.3 Only
individuals make choices; only individuals may act on the basis of those choices. This
requirement leads him to reject the notion of irreducible responsibility that French
(1998) embraces and consider the requirements for placing group responsibility onto
individuals from the perspective of the individual’s revealed behavior. The existence
and degree of culpability for other group members depends primarily on the voluntari-
ness of the relationship between those individuals and the group. Consent to member-
ship is the mechanism through which collective responsibility (blame) may be
transmitted to the individual members. As Narveson puts it:
[T]hose who willingly identify with institutions and groups that intend evil share in the
responsibility, and the relevant moral obloquy, that the group’s actions and professions
entail. The relevant variable, as we see, is again one that reduces the collective aspect to
an individual one. (Narveson 2002: 192)
Limited liability corporations, charities, universities, marriages and social clubs are all
examples of voluntary groups. An individual who accepts an employer’s employment
offer voluntarily joins the voluntary group formed by that enterprise. Such employment
relationships are morally similar, even if the ‘enterprise’ is the business of the state.
We can ascribe blame in this manner not simply due to mere guilt by association, or
geographical proximity, but because voluntary membership in an organization implies
acceptance of, or at the very least tolerance of, the principles for which the organization
stands. In addition, all members of organizations contribute in some way, even if
indirectly, towards the mission or purpose of the group through a division of labor.
Thus, while an individual may not be directly involved with some untoward aspect
of the group’s behavior, as a contributing member of the organization, the individual
marginally advances the organization in pursuit of its goals.
Consider the following hypothetical scenario. Suppose an individual named Smith
joins a social club. The club’s members meet at a local restaurant on a weekly basis
to enjoy each other’s company. After a number of meetings, Smith learns that the
other members of the club are actually involved in robbing banks (or some other mani-
festly illegal and/or immoral activity). So, rather than being a voluntary member of a
mere social club, Smith learns she is actually a member of an organization whose
mission includes systematically robbing banks. Even if Smith is not personally involved
in the wrongdoing, continued voluntary membership in such an organization implies
consent to the club’s aims. In addition, her individual contributions to the group
pursuant to her membership (i.e. membership dues, attendance at meetings, etc.) actu-
ally serve to advance the goals of the organization.
Thus, we place Smith under a moral imperative to act. She can either voluntarily exit
the group, thus severing her ties to the immoral activity of the organization’s members,
or she can maintain membership but convince the organization to change the purpose
of the group and no longer engage in such behavior. But it is clear that simply main-
taining the status quo does nothing to relieve the burden of the moral imperative.





































Just as Smith is a member of a club with voluntary entry and exit, so too is every
active duty career military officer. All career officers are voluntary members of the
Executive Branch of the federal government, a ‘club’ whose collective goal includes
the support of and defense of the Constitution. One’s continued membership in this
organization implies at least tacit approval of the morality of Executive Branch policy
across all departments and agencies, especially as it pertains to the profession of arms
and the application of force. And one’s continued contribution to the mission of their
service and/or Department of Defense enhances the government’s ability to execute the
immoral policy elsewhere in the organization. In other words, because people are will-
ing to become or remain career military officers, this frees up manpower to man the
department that implements the immoral policy. Thus, we ascribe blame through a
narrow mechanism of collective responsibility to career military officers for the uncon-
stitutional, immoral, or illegal policies or procedures of other government agents. While
our focus in this article is on career military officers, the same logic would apply to all
voluntary employees of the Executive Branch, to include civil servants, political appoin-
tees and elected officials.
Our discussion provides a unique perspective on the debate in the literature concern-
ing the moral equivalency of combatants (MEC). Taking modern just war theory as a
point of departure, Walzer (1977, 2007) holds that combatants on different sides in a
war share the same moral status (in terms of rights, liabilities and duties) as long as
they comply with jus in bello strictures. Thus, it is neither necessary nor appropriate
for soldiers to question the political decision to go to war. Rodin (2008) refers to
this as the independence principle, in that the manner in which the war is fought is
independent of the causes that brought it about. Other theorists such as McMahan
(2006, 2007a), Schoonhoven (2010), and to a lesser extent Rodin (2008), argue that sol-
diers who participate in an unjust war are not morally equivalent to those fighting on
the just side. Since participating in an unjust war exposes a soldier to moral culpability,
soldiers have an interest in avoiding that situation and are hence justified in ensuring
the probity of the jus ad bellum decision.4 Similarly, one could employ the argument
I outline in the present article to suggest that, given certain sufficiency conditions,
career military officers who participate in an unjust war are morally blameworthy for
being part of an organization that pursues unjust ends. Thus, officers have a duty to
question the jus ad bellum decision to participate in an unjust war, but I arrive at
this conclusion by leveraging particular aspects of collective responsibility, rather
than just war theory per se.
The present analysis differs from the MEC debate in at least two aspects. First, the
domain of the argument I outline is substantially larger in scope than jus ad bellum
– jus in bello considerations. My argument applies to all policy decisions made by
the federal government, not just the decision to go to war; although, given the destruc-
tiveness of modern warfare and military members’ inherent proximity to it, it is natural
that any jus ad bellum decision should command special attention from the officer
corps. Second, the primary focus of my analysis is on the moral standing of individuals
who do not directly participate in the morally questionable activity. In contrast, the
focus of the MEC debate is on individuals who find themselves fighting in an unjust
war.





































What follows is a synthesis of ideas of group responsibility with some of the more
traditional stipulations of individual morality, such as knowledge of the improper
act, which allows us to conclude that under certain circumstances, otherwise unin-
volved military officers may be held morally blameworthy for the acts of other govern-
ment agents. The stipulations comprise a system of sufficient conditions, thus
describing one of possibly numerous mechanisms that may be applicable. I will discuss
the implications of this chain of reasoning and sketch an outline of appropriate
responses in section 3.
2 Sufficient Conditions to Ascribe Blame to Career Military Officers
Suppose an agency or department of the federal government engages in manifestly
immoral, illegal, or unconstitutional policy, and Jones, a career military officer, is
aware of this fact. We ascribe blame to Jones and place him under the burden of a
moral imperative due to the following reasons:
C1. The perpetrators of the immoral act in question are fellow group members (i.e.
employees, agents, or officers of the Executive Branch).
C2. The group in question, namely, the Executive Branch of the federal government, is
one of voluntary entry and exit (or at least exit).
C3. The group tolerates the act in question.
C4. The individual is aware of the commission of the act.
When these four conditions hold, Jones is under the burden of a moral imperative to
resolve the breach. In this section, I describe why each condition is satisfied in this case.
2.1 Military Service Implies Membership in a Myriad of Morally Relevant
Groups (C1)
I will follow French (1984) and Corlett (2001) in drawing a distinction between aggre-
gates and conglomerates. Aggregates are simply random collections of individuals,
while conglomerates are organizations of people. Trivially, at any point in time, there
may be a collection of people on the corner of First Avenue and Main Street, waiting
to cross the street. This collection is an aggregate because it lacks a unifying purpose
or organization. French (1984: 13) outlines the following characteristics that set con-
glomerates apart from aggregates, which I adopt here.5 Conglomerates:
(a) possess an internal governing body and decision-making processes;
(b) possess a mechanism that enforces a code of conduct; and
(c) have roles with particular authorities through which individuals may rotate.
It is almost trivial to point out that nearly every military unit satisfies the definition of a
conglomerate. Unit commanders and staffs are part of each unit’s rule-making process.
Codes of conduct, which include not only explicit directives such as the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, but service-related (and unit-related) cultural norms are enforced at
every level. Finally, the command structure is a hierarchy that persists even as individ-
uals change assignments, and so on. Sandin (2007: 308; original emphasis) refers to
military units as ‘core examples of conglomerates’.





































It is clear that the Executive Branch of the federal government also satisfies the
requirements of a conglomerate. There exists a manner in which the group sets policy,
namely the President, as chief executive, cabinet level officials and other administrators
are responsible for setting the policy of the Executive Branch. Such policy is carried out
through a precisely defined hierarchical chain of command. This chain starts with the
President and eventually flows to every single Executive Branch employee. The
hierarchical structure persists even as bureaucrats, civil servants and political appoin-
tees transition to other assignments throughout their careers. And finally, the federal
government has an enforced code of conduct that is different from the at-large
population. The source of this code ranges from federal statutes to executive orders
and regulatory guidelines.
Military officers are therefore members of a set of nested organizations that easily
satisfy the definition of conglomerates, from their unit up through the chain of com-
mand to their service, the Department of Defense, and finally the entire Executive
Branch. Entry into these groups can be said to be entirely voluntary only at the service
level and above. One volunteers to join (or stay in) the Navy, but after that someone
other than the individual typically decides the billets to which the individual is assigned,
and thereby his or her membership in subordinate conglomerates. The previous section
demonstrates that exit from the service in general, and by extension from each of these
groups, is voluntary for career officers.
Thus, career military officers are voluntary members of a number of organizations by
virtue of their employment relationship with the federal government. These organiz-
ations are conglomerates that range from the individual’s unit, to each successive
unit up the chain of command to the Commander in Chief and culminating in the
conglomerate that is the entire Executive Branch of government.
2.2 Continued Service for Career Officers Is Overwhelmingly Voluntary (C2)
Following Narveson (2002), groups can be considered in terms of entry and exit, each of
which can be either voluntary or involuntary. Take, for example, one’s race. While race
is very much a social category, rather than a biological one, it is ‘assigned’ at birth.
While individuals may mask it, people are fundamentally powerless to change it.
Thus, one’s race constitutes membership in a group characterized by involuntary
entry and involuntary exit.
Since one does not choose to join a particular race and one is unable to quit once
assigned, individuals cannot be held morally responsible for injustices perpetrated on
the part of other members of that race. Involuntary entry implies that the individual
does not necessarily accept the particular set of values or goals of a group. It follows
from involuntary exit that an outside observer cannot reasonably use an individual’s
continued membership in such a group as evidence of revealed preference for the
actions of others in the group. Simply put, if one did not choose to join the group
and cannot choose to exit, they may receive neither blame nor credit for membership.
Alternatively, consider voluntary entry / voluntary exit groups. Because members of
these groups knowingly and willingly associate with the group and accept the values
and mission of the group, their continued membership reveals at a minimum





































acceptance of group norms. Mellema (2006) parallels this line of thinking in some ways
when he refers to promises as one of several types of ‘qualifying acts’ by which individ-
uals may become members of a morally relevant collective. All federal employees swear
an oath to the Constitution, a very powerful and explicit manifestation of a promise that
binds members of a collective. Thus, group membership allows an outside observer to
conclude that individuals who remain members of the group find the behavior of group
members acceptable or at least tolerable. This is the primary mechanism by which
members of organizations who personally do not participate in unethical acts may
still be held morally blameworthy for actions committed by other group members.
Ultimately, the determination of the voluntariness with which one enters or leaves a
group may be subjective and imprecise. While the entry or exit criteria for certain
groups are categorized as involuntary because membership is not the result of the indi-
vidual’s choice (e.g. race), other groups are categorized as involuntary because some
measure of coercion is associated with such decisions. An individual who risks signifi-
cant bodily harm for leaving a group is not a voluntary member. Such an individual can
only be held morally culpable – if at all – for any immoral acts that he or she personally
perpetrates. Examples of duress for our purposes include credible threat of death,
serious bodily harm and imprisonment. The fact that such duress may be the result
of the legal or legitimate application of force on the part of the state does not substan-
tively change its nature.
Note that pecuniary costs are rarely sufficient to constitute duress, especially if con-
tracted in advance. Because certain contracts may be costly to breach does not necess-
arily render their continued execution involuntary in any way. Military members
receive a valuable defined benefit pension upon retirement. While resigning before
satisfying the requirements for such a benefit may be costly, such considerations do
not impact the voluntariness of continuing the employment relationship. Unlike
other labor contracts, the military labor contract contains substantial penalties for
breach and unique limitations concerning the member’s freedom to exit. While such
restrictions substantially restrict the relationship, I will attempt to demonstrate that
for career officers the relationship remains voluntary.
I will focus on career officers because it avoids complexities of the initial service
obligation.6 Officers serving their initial contract may (perhaps appropriately) claim
that they did not understand or appreciate the unique nature of military service. Career
officers, having been given at least one opportunity to exit and having refrained from
exercising it, may not make this claim. Not only does the officer make this decision
voluntarily, but he or she does so on the basis of five to ten years of experience of
military culture, politics and challenges.
I identify two broad restrictions on an officer’s ability to terminate their employment
contract.7 The first category restricts the circumstances under which an officer may
freely seek to sever the employment relationship without risk of punishment. No
military member may unilaterally sever their employment contract with the govern-
ment. Doing so constitutes desertion, a criminal offense punishable under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), with punishments including (in wartime) death.
Similarly, an officer who quits (or attempts to) while engaged in combat with the
enemy may be subject to court martial under Article 99 of the UCMJ, Misbehavior





































before the Enemy. Both of these laws refer to imminent combat situations and are not
cases that I explore here, primarily because such cases represent a minimal proportion
of the typical military member’s career.
The second category is the alacrity with which the government must honor an offi-
cer’s request to resign. Personnel who are eligible for resignation may submit a letter
requesting to leave active duty. Such requests are typically approved within a matter
of weeks (for those eligible to resign or retire) and a separation date is assigned typically
not earlier than four months from the date of request. However, the employment con-
tract empowers the government to institute a policy commonly known as ‘stop-loss’.8
Title 10 empowers the President to suspend the separation of any individual in the mili-
tary deemed critical to national security. But even during stop-loss, individuals are free
to request consideration for resignation. Exigent circumstances such as armed conflict
may very much inhibit an individual’s ability to exit the military freely.
In all cases, one who has legally requested, and been denied, resignation may cor-
rectly consider themselves to have gained entry in the involuntary exit group, which
we may call those who have in good faith requested and been denied (or delayed) resig-
nation. While individuals in this condition are still employees of the federal govern-
ment, the nature of the relationship is fundamentally changed in that it is no longer
voluntary. As an involuntary member of the organization, they can no longer be
held morally responsible for the actions of others in the group.
Consistent with our argument, the presence or absence of duress is the key factor in
determining the voluntariness of the military officer’s employment contract. Yes, the
military member must abide by special restrictions, which include requesting per-
mission to sever one’s employment contract. However, in most circumstances, an indi-
vidual can seek resignation without fear of sanction. If resignation is denied, the officer
may take solace in the idea that they have fulfilled their duty to resolve the moral
imperative. Because their relationship with the government is now involuntary, they
are no longer blameworthy.
In summary, career officers who wish to leave the service may reasonably expect to
do so. Minimally, the individual is capable of satisfying honor by registering one’s desire
and intent to resign without facing criminal punishment in all but the most exigent cir-
cumstances. This places career military officers as members of a voluntary entry/
voluntary exit group.
2.3 Organizations Must Tolerate Immoral Behavior (C3)
In this section, I examine the relationship between the individual and the conglomerate
with regard to norms. Specifically, I discuss how federal employees may apprehend the
norms of a group and determine whether observed behavior of group members
represents isolated incidents or are the manifestations of unethical norms. Simply
put, I examine the problem that an individual may face in determining if his or her
conglomerate is behaving immorally.
Norms are the set of rules that govern the behavior of group members. We may cat-
egorize norms as being of two types: de jure and de facto. De jure norms are explicitly
codified policies.De facto norms are how policy is enforced in practice. This perspective





































acknowledges that policy as executed in reality is rarely identical to its written form, but
both types of norms are important in determining the moral standing of the conglom-
erate. The source for all de jure norms is the internal rule-making organization within
the conglomerate. In addition, the internal rule-making structure may also be respon-
sible for shaping many, or most, de facto norms as well. For example, the consistent fail-
ure to discipline individual bad behavior of a particular sort is itself a policy of omission
from this internal rule-making organization.9 This line of thinking generally parallels
Silver’s (2006: 271) notions regarding the role of culture in corporate responsibility.
If a conglomerate implements a de jure policy that violates moral code, or in the case
of the federal government violates the Constitution, then that sort of behavior is a suf-
ficient condition to render even uninvolved group members morally blameworthy. The
clearest way for an organization to state its principles is to develop an explicit policy on
the matter. While the individuals involved in carrying out the policy in practice are
guilty of personally violating the ethical code and are blameworthy in their own
right, those group members not involved are also blameworthy (if the other conditions
hold) due to their voluntary association with a group that violates ethics as a matter of
explicit policy.
One way an outsider may evaluate the relative positions of de jure and de facto norms
is to see how the group enforces (or fails to enforce) a de jure norm when it is violated.
Consider the following example. Suppose an infantry squad conducts a combat patrol
through several villages as part of a larger counterinsurgency operation. During their
patrol, they experience an ambush and engage in a firefight with combatants firing
from a farmhouse. After several hours of fighting, they defeat the enemy fighters and
secure the house. In retaliation for appearing to harbor enemy fighters, the patrol mem-
bers bind and summarily execute the remaining occupants of the house, some of whom
are civilian women and children. Finally, they call in an air strike to destroy the
evidence.10
The individuals in our example are clearly guilty of violating ethical and legal restric-
tions. If they are vigorously prosecuted, then we may conclude that it was an isolated
incident and the organization does not tolerate such behavior in accordance with its
de jure policy. In other words, in such a case the organization confirmed its principles
and all group members could rest assured that the group to which they belong does not
condone or tolerate such behavior. As such, the uninvolved members of the broader
organization would accrue no moral blame, because (a) such individuals did not perpe-
trate any illegal acts themselves and (b) the group decisively confirmed that the act con-
flicted with group norms.
The primary concern is whether the group tolerates such aberrations. In the above
hypothetical case, the organization used the incident to demonstrate that the de facto
policy is consistent with the de jure policy prohibiting such behavior. Alternatively, fail-
ure to vigorously prosecute the perpetrators or tendency to mete out light sentences is
evidence that the de facto policy, in allowing such behavior, is not aligned with the de
jure policy. It is not appropriate to pick a number for how many such incidents are
required to form a pattern of behavior that allows group members to conclude that
de facto policy diverges from de jure. Instead, I argue that the threshold is likely very
low and moves inversely with the egregiousness of the act, or acts, in question.





































Symptoms of misalignment between stated and actual policy are not necessarily the fre-
quency with which these ethical violations occur, but whether those responsible are
punished.
If de facto and de jure policies diverge in practice, which should take precedence? The
answer is the one that most violates the relevant ethical standard. For example, suppose
that Congress passes and the President signs a law granting the federal government the
power to summarily execute redheads. Suppose further that the law has been on the
books for several years but to date, no redhead has been executed. While the de facto
policy is that the government does not execute redheads, the de jure policy should
cause serious concern. Thus, I assert that the maximum divergence of either de jure
or de facto norms from the individual’s personal ethics constitutes the magnitude of
the moral imperative.
For an individual to be morally culpable for the actions of others due simply to mem-
bership in a group, the group must tolerate morally objectionable actions. Tolerance
implies that such behavior is consistent with either the de facto or de jure policy of
the organization. Isolated incidents of wrongdoing in which the individual otherwise
has no connection except group membership do not implicate the otherwise uninvolved
individual. However, du jure policy that conflicts with the fundamental norm or ethical
constraints, or otherwise appropriate policy that when carried out in practice violates
the fundamental ethical constraints, does place individuals under the burden of the
moral imperative.
2.4 Awareness of the Act is Essential (C4)
The final requirement necessary to generate a moral imperative for a group member is
awareness of the commission of an immoral act. First-hand knowledge of such acts is
sufficient, but not necessary. Due to the sheer size of some of the morally relevant
groups in question (the United States Navy, the Department of Defense, etc.), the
issue of awareness is critical.11
In the absence of first-hand knowledge as a participant in, or a witness to, immoral
behavior, all other reports of such activity must be weighed appropriately. It is not our
purpose here to attempt to define the factors of credibility, but rather to give an idea of
its range. Public policy and legislation are at the top of the credibility spectrum, but only
in terms of admission of or allowance of particular behavior. While public government
admissions of wrongdoing tend to be sufficiently credible to impart a moral imperative
on group members, public denial of wrongdoing is not necessarily sufficient to settle the
matter. On the opposite end of the spectrum is action taken on incorrect information
(see the example below). Career officers may be members of several large groups with
members that number into the millions, but it is still possible for them to acquire suffi-
ciently credible information of wrongdoing that would place them under the burden of
a moral imperative.
I now briefly turn to the question of how the notional officer Jones determines that a
particular policy is immoral, illegal, or unconstitutional. For the purposes of our discus-
sion, I have essentially assumed that such a determination is manifestly and objectively
obvious. However, in practice this is rarely the case. In reality, individuals make their





































determinations on their subjective assessment of the facts of the case and the relevant
legal jurisprudence or the individual’s personal moral code.
It is recommended that an officer who takes action as a result of a perceived moral
imperative does so within the domain of his or her expertise.12 Consider the case of
Lieutenant Colonel Terry Lakin, an Army doctor who refused orders to deploy to
Afghanistan unless and until President Obama produced what Lakin considered to
be a legitimate birth certificate. He ultimately pled guilty to failure to obey orders
and was sentenced to six months in prison. While Lakin presumably acted according
to his conscience, his actions were fatally flawed because he protested based on his
perceived (and ultimately, incorrect) expertise on the topic of constitutional law. Rather
than serving as a mere cautionary tale, the Lakin case should provide incentive to
officers to become experts in the aspects of the profession to make appropriate assess-
ments of policies and controversial issues.
Alternatively, consider the actions of Specialist Joseph Darby. In 2004, he was a mili-
tary police officer assigned to the 372nd Military Police Company, which at the time
had cognizance over Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. Upon learning of the abuses heaped
on the detainees by members of his unit, he provided evidence to the US Army Criminal
Investigation Command and set in motion an investigation that ultimately prompted
the court martial of a number of junior soldiers. Given the public outrage and criminal
proceedings in response to the revelations (once they were made public), we can con-
clude that Darby was correct in assuming that the treatment he observed was, in fact,
manifestly illegal and his decision to come forward was ultimately validated. However,
for those particularly concerned with the professionalism and competence of the officer
corps, we are left to wonder why such a junior member of that unit was the first to
realize that the manner in which the treatment policy was being executed was, in
fact, repugnant.
3. Discussion of Implications and Appropriate Responses
In this article, I establish one mechanism through which we may reasonably ascribe
moral blame to career military officers for illegal, unconstitutional, or immoral policies
of government agencies. In this section, I briefly discuss a few of the implications of this
finding and map out directions for future work.
If we suppose that a moral imperative of the sort I described above exists, the next
step is to outline the individual’s rights, duties and immunities with respect to relieving
this burden. A thorough determination of the proper action necessary to discharge the
moral imperative would greatly exceed the scope of this article, although a brief sketch
is in order.
It should be uncontroversial to assert that career military officers should know that if
they ever perceive a moral dilemma in which their duty to obey the orders of a senior
officer conflicts with their moral compass (i.e. their perception of Constitutionality),
they must either resign their commission or refuse the order and weather the conse-
quences. One of the most developed frameworks along these lines is Roush’s (2008)
Constitutional Paradigm of Military Ethics, which has been taught for decades, in
one form or another, throughout the naval service to officers and officer candidates.





































The Constitutional Paradigm of Military Ethics provides a relatively effective set of
guidelines for an individual who believes that he or she has received an illegal order
from a senior officer. It says that the core obligation against which orders must be
measured is the US Constitution, and then this baseline is applied through the levels
of Mission, Service, Command, Comrades and Self (Roush 2008: 205, see also Jensen
2013). According to this model, higher-priority duties on the list override lower-priority
duties in cases of conflict. However, the model provides little to no direct guidance to
the officer who believes that a moral imperative compels them to oppose the policy of,
say, the Central Intelligence Agency. The officer in question has not received an order,
illegal or otherwise, so there is no order to refuse. While resignation would almost
certainly discharge the moral imperative, it would also likely fail to communicate effec-
tively anything to those responsible for the policy in question. Thus, an implication of
the argument made in this article is that the Constitutional Paradigm of Military Ethics
should be modified to accommodate this unique species of moral dilemma.
Ultimately, any action short of resignation still leaves the officer presumptively
under the burden of the moral imperative. Jones’s continued employment relationship
with the government would lead an impartial outside observer to conclude on the basis
of her revealed behavior that she at least tacitly approves of the manifestly immoral
policy. Thus, it seems intuitive to suggest that if she elects not to resign, she has the
duty to attempt to positively influence the policy, possibly including some form of pub-
lic declaration of dissent or protest. A public declaration of (a) one’s critique of the pol-
icy and (b) one’s intention to seek to improve the policy would help to eliminate any
ambiguity and enable the outside observer not to count Jones among those individuals
who agree with or accept the immoral policy. Note, ‘public’ in this case may simply be
some forum that only includes other officers, rather than the civilian populace at large.
Another important implication of the preceding analysis is that military officers have
a duty to monitor the moral rectitude of other government agents, specifically in
relation to their official capacities to devise and execute policy. Because officers person-
ally bear moral culpability for the actions of others within their group, military officers
are justified in scrutinizing their behavior and possibly even in offering criticism of it.
There is a norm in the Marine Corps, and to a lesser extent the other services, that
essentially gives license to any Marine, even very junior Marines, to (respectfully)
inform senior Marines when that senior is in violation of a norm or regulation. Such
violations are typically mundane, such as putting one’s hands in one’s pockets or wear-
ing improper clothing while exercising. The argument of this article suggests that a
similar norm for all government employees is in order.
In addition, military officers should pay special attention to the composition of the
organizations in which they are members, particularly that part of the organization that
inflicts violence on behalf of the US government. Historically, taking part in war on
behalf of the government was almost the sole domain of the uniformed services;
however, due to the broad interpretation of the 2001 Authorization to Use Military
Force, this group now includes the Central Intelligence Agency (and others) and certain
private security contractors. The group those in the employ of the Executive Branch who
engage in war on behalf of the federal government is of particular interest for military
members, not just for the practical reason that members of this group often impact





































the success of military operations, but because military officers possess special expertise
in the moral conduct of war as part of their adherence to the professional military
ethic.13
A final implication is that military officers have a duty not just to keep informed of
potentially controversial policy developments, but also to educate themselves on the rel-
evant legal, moral and Constitutional doctrine. It is erroneous for an officer to conclude
simply that since they are not directly involved in the execution of a particular policy,
they have no moral relationship to the wrongdoing perpetrated by other government
officials. While few officers are constitutional scholars, all are capable of educating
themselves sufficiently. Common sense and propriety compels officers to read and
understand the document that they have sworn an oath to support and defend.
The initial and continued moral and legal education of officers is a critical aspect of
the professionalization of the officer corps (Huntington 1957: 7–18).14 The ‘special trust
and confidence’ found in the officers’ commissioning warrant is indicative of the credi-
bility that the officer would enjoy on these matters.
4 Conclusion
The primary aim of this article has been to initiate a conversation regarding the notion
that career military officers are, under certain circumstances, morally culpable for
particular forms of immoral behavior perpetrated on the part of other government offi-
cials. Officers who recognize immoral policies are not shielded from culpability simply
because they are not personally involved; rather, they are placed under the burden of a
moral imperative to act so as to resolve the conflict.
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Notes
1. I concentrate on the case of members of the US military, mainly due to my familiarity with
it. Given sufficient institutional similarity, the argument could apply to the armed forced of
other countries as well.
2. These discussions continue today with more recent contributions on terrorism and collec-
tive responsibility (Jollimore 2007, Miller 2006, Reiff 2008, Wilkins 1992). For surveys of the
general literature on collective responsibility, see Mellema (1997) and Smiley (2011).
3. For several additional theories that approach collective responsibility from a perspective of
methodological individualism, see Sverdlik (1987), Goldman (1970), Miller (2006) and
Mathiesen (2006).
4. For a collection of contributions to this debate, see Rodin and Shue (2008); for a general
overview, see Syse (2015).





































5. Contrast French’s requirements for conglomerates with May’s (1987: 29) substantially lower
threshold for group status being when a collection of individuals displays either capacity for
joint action or common interests.
6. I also neglect to consider the case of enlisted members. There are likely many parallels
between officers and enlisted members, particularly senior enlisted or non-commissioned
officers in this context; however, there may also be several important differences. I acknowl-
edge these difficulties and leave the analysis of these differences to future work.
7. I concentrate on resignation because it is the least restrictive manner in which an officer
may leave the service.
8. Title 10, United States Code, Section 12305(a) which states in part: ‘… the President may
suspend any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation applicable
to any member of the armed forces who the President determines is essential to the national
security of the United States.’
9. Note, crucially, that this framework does not necessarily rely on questions of collective
intent. In Corlett’s (2001) terms, while most de jure norms probably satisfy the definition
of collective action and thereby likely qualify as indications of collective intent, some de
facto norms may only qualify as collective behavior.
10. While bearing similarity to some historical cases, this is strictly a hypothetical example of a
manifestly illegal and immoral incident.
11. Other scholars have noted that military bureaucracies are often designed to limit the
amount of knowledge that certain agents possess (Crawford 2007: 199).
12. For a discussion of the role that ignorance plays in implicating or excusing participation in
unjust or unethical behavior, see Sola (2009).
13. For a discussion of the impact of the employment of private security contractors in war on
professional military ethics, see Hedahl (2009).
14. For a discussion of recent advances in ethical education at the United States Naval
Academy, see Wertheimer (2010); for a book-length treatment intended to be accessible
to the military officer, see Cook (2013). For discussions of the importance of such education
from the perspective of an experience senior officer, see McMaster (2010) and Challans
(2007).
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